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Abstract  Based  on  a  Cobb--Douglas  social  welfare  function  in  terms  of  the  utilities  of  two
concurrent generations,  this  paper  derives  a  Pareto-efﬁcient,  envy-free,  and  equitable  inter-
est rate  rule  supported  by  a  nonlinear-tax  feedback  rule  in  case  of  steady-state  disturbance.
The young  are  taxed  to  subsidize  the  elderly,  expecting  the  same  treatment  when  the  young
become old;  hence,  ﬁscal  policy  matters  as  much  as  the  monetary  policy  does  with  regard  to
the ‘‘same’’.  The  emphasis  on  monetary  policy  lies  rather  in  the  fact  that  once  the  equilib-
rium status  quo  of  a  policy  accommodative  of  a  given  tax  subsidy-cum-interest  rate  scheme  is
disturbed, the  ‘‘interest-rate  part’’  will  continue  being  a  sensible  policy  choice  only  by  manip-
ulating the  ‘‘tax-subsidy  part’’.  From  the  political  economy  view  of  tax  nonlinearity,  the  tax
policy under  instability  is  expected  to  be  both  a  self-conﬁrming  and  a  perfect  insight  majority
rule equilibrium.
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PALABRAS  CLAVE
Normas  monetarias  y  normas  de  retroalimentación  ﬁscal
Resumen  Basándose  en  una  función  de  bienestar  social  de  Cobb--Douglas  en  términos  de  las
utilidades de  2  generaciones  concurrentes,  este  documento  extrae  una  norma  sobre  tipos  de
interés, que  es  eﬁciente  conforme  a  Pareto,  libre  de  conﬂictos,  y  equitativa,  sustentada  por
una norma  de  retroalimentación  de  los  impuestos  no  lineales  en  caso  de  alteración  del  equi-Norma  monetaria; librio. La  ﬁscalidad  de  los  jóvenes  se  utiliza  como  subsidio  para  los  mayores,  esperándose  este
Norma  de
retroalimentación
ﬁscal;
Planiﬁcador  social
mismo tratamiento  cuando  dichos  jóvenes  envejezcan;  por  tanto,  la  política  ﬁscal  tiene  tanta
importancia  como  la  política  monetaria  para  «los  mismos».  El  énfasis  sobre  la  política  mone-
taria radica  más  bien  en  el  hecho  de  que  una  vez  que  se  altera  el  statu  quo  de  equilibrio  de  una
política que  se  acomoda  a  un  programa  de  tipos  de  interés  unidos  a  subsidios  ﬁscales,  la  «parte
de tipos  de  interés» seguirá  siendo  una  elección  de  política  prudente  solo  si  se  manipula  la
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«parte  de  subsidios  ﬁscales».  Desde  la  óptica  de  la  economía  política  de  la  no  linealidad  ﬁscal,
es probable  que  la  política  ﬁscal  en  condiciones  de  inestabilidad  constituya  tanto  un  equilibrio
de la  norma  mayoritaria  autoveriﬁcativo  como  de  percepción  perfecta.
© 2014  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
1
I
i
f
w
t
o
u
a
v
A
(
l
(
f
s
m
i
s
m
t
A
l
g
u
c
p
w
u
L
Q
i
v
i
m
w
g
(
r
a
t
m
b
t
a
h
t
r
b
s
d
w
e
p
p
e
t
e
i
g
c
o
b
i
a
t
s
m
a
W
e
c
t
b
a
ﬁ
c
i
o
t
t
c
a
t
i
t
W
a
i
a
s‘‘Fiscal  policy  and  monetary  policy  are  both  beautiful;
we  need  them  both  and  we  should  treat  them  both  lov-
ingly.’’  Arthur  M.  Okun  (1971,  p.  51)
. Introduction
t  is  noteworthy  that  the  debate  on  ‘‘rules  vs.  discretion’’
n  economic  policymaking  has  not  managed  to  capitalize  so
ar  upon  optimal  control  theory  suggestions  that  if  rules  do
ork  they  can  be  improved  if  followed  by  feedback  rules,
oo  (see  e.g.  Kydland  and  Prescott,  1977).  Actually,  not  much
n  this  debate  per  se  has  been  done  save  some  studies  doc-
menting  empirically  the  alleged  tradeoff  between  rules
nd  discretion,  and  other  work  examining  theoretically  the
arious  aspects  of  it,  by  Friedman  (2012), Taylor  (2012),
mador  et  al.  (2006),  Albanesi  et  al.  (2003),  Canzoneri
1985),  and  Goldfeld  (1982)  among  others.  Lately,  authors
ike  Carluccio  and  Menegatti  (2012),  Arestis  and  Mihailov
2009),  and  Athey  et  al.  (2005),  appear  to  leave  some  room
or  limited  compromise,  but  nowhere  is  to  be  found  a  discus-
ion  about  complementarity  from  the  viewpoint  of  having  a
onetary  policy  rule  becoming  operational  just  because  it
s  accompanied  by  a  ﬁscal  policy  feedback  rule  in  a  dynamic
ystem.
Also,  note  that  if  the  focus  of  such  a  system  is  to  be  the
edium-  and  long-run,  it  should  be  having  an  intergenera-
ional  form,  because  aging  changes  the  generation  one  is  in.
nd,  if  aging  alters  quite  plausibly  preferences  the  particu-
ar  intergenerational  form  should  be  the  one  of  overlapping
enerations  and  not  that  of  the  inﬁnitely  lived  individ-
al.  Now,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  overlapping-generations
ash-in-advance  speciﬁcation,  which  is  adopted  herein  too,
ostulates  a  Diamond  (1965)  utility  function  of  consumption
hen  young  and  consumption  when  old;  and  it  does  so  almost
niformly  in  the  relevant  literature  (see  e.g.  Yanagihara  and
u,  2013;  Gahvari,  2009;  Smith,  2003;  Crettez  et  al.,  1999;
i,  1994,  and  the  subsequent  literature).  Nevertheless,  pol-
cymaking  should  be  approached  under  a  social  planner’s
iewpoint,  and  hence,  based  on  a  social  welfare  function
ncorporating  explicitly  the  standard  analytical  parable  of
onetary  overlapping-generations  modeling  according  to
hich  the  young  and  the  old  are  two  different  concurrent
enerations,  with  the  former  altering  behavior  as  they  age
see  e.g.  McCallum,  1983).
To  tackle  the  issue  of  monetary  and  ﬁscal  policy
ules  complementarity,  this  paper  elaborates  upon  such
 ‘‘social-planner  overlapping-generations’’  approach
hrough  a  stylized  model  of  this  sort.  It  is  driven  by  the
ere  logical  fact  that  there  has  to  be  some  entity  to  be
ridging  the  two  generations  for  policy  to  exist.  There  has
o  be  therefore  a  social  planner  taking  subsequently  into
ccount  the  element  of  intergenerational  equality  without
i
i
A
Qurting  individual  preferences,  in  fostering  at  the  same
ime  monetary  equilibrium.  Put  differently,  this  bridging
aises  the  issues  of  intergenerational  equality  and  envy
eyond  the  matter  of  Pareto  efﬁciency,  and  the  planner’s
olution  has  to  be  not  only  as  Pareto  efﬁcient  as  the  solution
esired  by  the  individual  but  equitable  and  envy-free  as
ell.  A  one-to-one  treatment  of  the  current  with  the  future
lderly  in  private  consumption  plus  the  respect  of  individual
references  with  regard  to  the  public  good  provided  by  the
lanner,  is  certainly  equitable,  and  is  the  ﬁrst  of  the  results.
But,  societal  welfare  would  still  be  suboptimal  without
quilibrium  in  the  market  of  the  bonds  that  are  issued  by
he  planner  toward  its  socioeconomic  obligations,  because
quilibrium  preservation  in  this  market  ensures  that  no
ntergenerational-envy  driven  disequilibria  are  prompted
iven  that  it  is  this  market  through  which  such  envy  would  be
hanneled.  And,  precisely  this  is  to  what  our  second  result
f  deriving  an  interest  rate  rule  corroborated  by  a  tax  feed-
ack  rule  amounts.  Indeed,  methodologically,  policymaking
s  sensible  at  off  equilibrium  states,  and  should  be  based  on
 ﬁscal  instrument  monitoring  and  correcting  for  the  devia-
ions  from  equilibrium  that  incapacitate  the  monetary  rule.
To  put  the  modeling  and  its  conclusions  into  further  per-
pective  with  the  relevant  literature,  complementarity  of
onetary  and  ﬁscal  rules  is  found  when  disequilibrium  is
ttributed  to  sticky  prices  too,  as,  for  instance,  Benigno  and
oodford  (2003)  or  Schmitt-Grohé  and  Uribe  (2007)  do.  Dis-
quilibrium  emanates  through  a  dynamic  system,  which  is
ompatible  with  the  Tinbergen  (1952)--Theil  (1958)  tradition
o  optimal  policymaking  even  if  the  dynamics  were  seen  to
e  intergenerational,  because  simply  they  would  be  about
n  inﬁnitely  lived  individual.  And,  indeed,  an  active  role  for
scal  policy  beyond  optimal  monetary  policy  considerations
an  come  up  once  additional  tax  instruments  are  introduced
nto  the  standard  analytical  framework  of  the  literature  on
ptimal  monetary  policy;  the  concern  is  the  minimization  of
he  consequences  of  nominal  rigidities  under  the  presump-
ion  that  only  lump-sum  taxes  are  available.
Complementarity  of  policy  rules  is  found  to  be  the
ase  here  too,  but  because  of  liquidity  disturbances,  which
re  modeled  as  coming  out  of  asynchronous  intergenera-
ional  decisions,  with  the  asynchronism  being  attributed  to
ntergenerational  equality-envy  considerations  rather  than
o  random  relocation  (see  e.g.  Haslag  and  Martin,  2007).
ithin  such  a  framework  of  envy  and/or  equality  induced
symmetric  intergenerational  information  with  regard  to
ntergenerational  transfers,  the  policymaker  assumes  an
dditional,  social-welfare  maximizing  role  beyond  the
trictly  economic  Tinbergen--Theil  one;  it  is  the  role  of
nsurer  against  this  asymmetric  information  that  the  bank-
ng  system  alone  cannot  assume  as  efﬁciently  as  in  an
rrow--Debreu  fashion  (see  e.g.  Diamond  and  Dybvig,  1983;
i,  1994).
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It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  the  modeling  in  this
paper  is  one  of  optimal  monetary  policy  too,  with  results
in  the  spirit  of  the  literature  on  optimal  ﬁscal  policy  as
well  in  two  respects.  First,  to  the  extent  that  monetary
policy  matters  under  ﬂexible  prices,  (perfect  competition
in  our  case),  and  ﬁnancial  instability  as  is  assumed  by
that  literature.  And,  second  and  more  importantly,  in  an
overlapping-generations  version  of  intergenerational  mod-
eling,  like  the  one  employed  below,  the  young  are  taxed  to
subsidize  the  elderly,  expecting  the  same  treatment  when
the  young  become  old;  hence,  ﬁscal  policy  matters  as  much
as  the  monetary  policy  does  with  regard  to  the  ‘‘same’’.  The
emphasis  on  monetary  policy  lies  rather  in  the  fact  that  once
the  equilibrium  status  quo  of  a  policy  accommodative  of  a
given  tax  subsidy-cum-interest  rate  scheme  is  disturbed,  the
‘‘interest-rate  part’’  will  continue  being  a  sensible  policy
choice  only  by  manipulating  the  ‘‘tax-subsidy  part’’.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  steady  state,  no  money  at  all  would
be  needed  to  carry  through  intergenerational  transfers  if
money  was  not  useful  in  taking  care  the  storage  problems
surrounding  goods,  ﬁscal  policy  would  be  equivalent  to  army
quartermaster  accounting,  and  the  social  planner  would  be
the  quartermaster  ofﬁcer.  An  intergenerational  mediator
armed  with  both,  monetary  and  ﬁscal  policy  instruments,
are  needed  only  at  off  equilibrium  states,  in  which  case
monetary  policy  serves  like  a  compass  pointer  guided  by  the
optimal  social-welfare,  which  only  the  mediator  can  han-
dle  efﬁciently.  In  a  non-overlapping  generations  context,  no
such  issues  can  be  raised  ex  hypothesi.  .  .  Anyway,  in  what
follows,  the  next  section  tackles  all  these  issues  formally  by
simply  deriving  Nash  demands  on  the  part  of  the  young  and
the  concurrent  old,  and  ﬁnding  them  to  differ  from  those
under  societal  optimum  when  the  time  subscript  is  allowed
to  be  making  a  difference.  The  paper  concludes  with  still
another  section  discussing  the  tax  rule  as  such  in  the  light
of  the  relevant  literature.
2. The model
Consider  a  constant-population  economy  which  is  composed
at  time  t of  a  young  generation  and  of  an  old  one,  with
agent  types,  y  and  o,  respectively.  Each  of  them  maxi-
mizes  utility  U  from  consumption,  c,  and  a  public  good,
G,  under  the  corresponding  budget  constraint.  The  plan-
ning  horizon  of  the  young  extends  to  time  t  +  1,  when  they
will  have  become  old,  and  when  the  current  old  will  not
‘‘be  around’’,  focusing  thereby  the  latter  exclusively  on
calculations  for  t.  Each  young  generation  receives  a  con-
sumption  bundle,  ,  as  manna  from  heaven,  and  is  called
for  to  handle  with  it  its  lifetime  utility  as  well  as  the  utility
of  its  contemporary  elderly  under  the  following  arrange-
ment:
Consumption  when  old,  co,  consists  of  goods  the  old  buy
from  the  young  on  the  basis  of  the  liquidation  of  bonds,  B,
acquired  when  young,  the  money  holdings  M  carried  over
from  t  to  t  +  1,  and  a  government  subsidy  of    percent  of
these  holdings  so  that  before  taxes:Cot =  (1  +  it−1)Bt−1 +  (1  +  t)Mt−1 (1)
Mt
Mt−1
=  1  +  t (2)
t
b
a39
here  i is  the  nominal  interest  rate.  The  government  exists
or  this  precisely  reason  as  well  as  because  the  young  have
greed  to  be  paying    percent  of  c,  when  young,  and  a  lump-
um  of  Tyt ,  when  young  plus  T
o
t+1,  when  old,  to  a  society-wide
nstitution,  and  to  be  lending  it  by  buying  its  bonds  toward
he  provision  of  pure  public  good  G  beyond  the  subsidy  of
M  to  the  elderly.
That  is,  at  time  t,  the  budget  constraint  of  the  current
ld  is  after  taxes:
tc
o
t =  pt[(1  +  it−1)Bt−1 +  (1  +  t)Mt−1 −  Tot ]  (3)
here  pt is  the  time  price  of  one  unit  of  money  from  the
iewpoint  that  discounting  takes  place  at  the  rate  of  inﬂa-
ion,  ,  as  described  by:
pt
pt−1
=  1  +  t (4)
nd  bonds  are  issued  in  terms  of  the  consumption  good.  The
udget  constraint  for  the  young  is:
tc
y
t =  ptt −  ptMt −  ptBt −  ptt+1Mt
−  pt(Tyt +  Tot+1)  −  ptcyt (5)
All  money  is  held  by  the  elderly  and  is  directed  to  pur-
hases  of  goods  from  the  young  while  even  more  goods  are
old  by  y  to  o  in  exchange  of  (1  +  it−1)Bt−1,  who  young  buy
lso  the  new  stock  of  B,  i.e.  Bt −  (1  +  it−1)Bt−1,  for  old  age,
ith:
Bt
Bt−1
=  1  +  bt (6)
 +  it =  (1  +  rt)(1  +  t) (7)
here  r  is  the  real  rate  of  interest  on  bonds  under  the
icksian--Morishima  view  of  being  the  price  of  illiquidity.
In  view  of  Eq.  (5),  Bt −  (1  +  it−1)Bt−1 =  (bt −  it−1)Bt−1:  The
ew  stock  of  B  will  be  zero  in  real  terms  if  bt =  it−1,  which
s  an  important  equilibrium  relationship  that  will  be  inter-
reted  later  in  the  text.
Finally,  the  government  would  be  restricted  by  its  own
urrent  at  t  budget  constraint,  too:
t
gt
1  +  gt Gt −  pt(T
y
t +  Tot +  Tot+1)  −  ptcyt
=  pt t1  +  t Mt +  pt
bt
1  +  bt Bt (8)
here
t −  Gt−1 = gt1  +  gt Gt
s  the  change  in  the  supply  of  the  public  good  between  the
wo  periods,  with:
Gt
Gt−1
=  1  +  gt (9)
The  future  tax  revenue  Tot+1 enters  into  the  current  gov-
rnment  budget  constraint,  because  it  is  the  one  regarding
he  two  generations  at  t  and  not  only  those  living  at  t.
The  government  as  a  social  planner  would  be  restricted
y  the  sum  of  the  budget  constraints  of  y  and  o  too,  which
fter  some  operations  is:
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1  +  )ptcyt +  ptcot =  ptt −  ptt+1Mt −  pt(Tyt +  Tot +  Tot+1)
+ pt(1  +  it−1)
1  +  bt Bt (10)
In  view  of  Eq.  (8),  the  budget  constraints  Eqs.  (3), (5),
nd  (10)  become:
tc
o
t =  pt
t +  (1  +  t)
1  +  t Mt +  pt
bt +  (1  +  it−1)
1  +  bt Bt
−  pt gt1  +  gt Gt +  pt(T
y
t +  Tot+1)  +  ptcyt (3′)
iven  also  Eqs.  (2)  and  (5),
tc
y
t =  ptt −  pt
1  +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t Mt
−  pt 11  +  bt Bt −  pt
gt
1  +  gt Gt +  ptT
o
t (5
′)
nd
tc
y
t +  ptcot =  ptt +  pt
t −  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t Mt
+  pt bt +  (1  +  it−1)1  +  bt Bt −  pt
gt
1  +  gt Gt (10
′)
espectively.
Now,  the  old  maximize  the  Cobb--Douglas  utility  function:
o
t =  (cot )ˇ1Gˇ2t (11)
ith  respect  to  cot ,  and  Gt subject  to  (3
′),  where  the  ˇ’s
re  constants.  The  young  maximize  the  Stone--Geary  utility
unction:
y
t =  (cyt − c¯y)a1 [(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]a2Gta3 (12)
ith  respect  to  cyt ,  Bt,  and  Gt,  subject  to  Eq.  (5
′),  where
y is  some  minimum  consumption  regardless  t,  the  a’s  are
onstants,  and  in  line  with  Eq.  (1),  cot+1 =  (1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +
t+1)Mt,  before  taxes.  The  Stone--Geary  speciﬁcation  simply
eﬂects  the  fact  that  one  has  to  secure  some  minimum  con-
umption  before  starting  creating  a  portfolio  and  that  one
annot  live  on  public  goods  alone.  There  is  not  such  a  min-
mum  when  old,  because  the  elderly  consume  all  which  has
ot  been  determined  to  consume  when  they  were  young,  in
hich  case  the  Stone--Geary  utility  function  coincides  with
he  Cobb--Douglas  one.  In  view  of  ﬁxed  for  the  elderly  G,  the
aximization  problem  makes  sense  from  the  viewpoint  that
ublic  and  private  goods  are  substitutes  or  complements  in
onsumption  (see  e.g.  Fiorito  and  Kollontzas,  2004).  And,  as
 matter  of  fact,  this  relationship  between  the  two  types  of
oods  can  be  critical  for  the  effectiveness  of  policymaking
see  e.g.  Ganelli  and  Tervala,  2009).
Finally,  the  government  maximizes  as  a  social  planner
ome  social  welfare  function  in  terms  of  the  utilities  of  the
wo  concurrent  generations:
 =  [(cyt − c¯y)a1 [(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]a2Gta3 ]ε
×  [(cot )ˇ1Gˇ2t ]1−ε (13)
ith  respect  to  cyt ,  c
o
t Bt,  and  Gt,  under  the  constraint  given
y  Eq.  (10′),  where  the  constant  ε  captures  the  prefer-
nces  of  the  planner  over  the  two  generations.  The  planner
ocuses  on  the  maximization  of  the  current  welfare  of  theG.T.  Soldatos,  E.  Varelas
wo  concurrent  generations  at  time  t,  plus  the  welfare  of  the
lderly  at  t  +  1,  so  that  Tot+1 only  from  its  future  tax  revenue
s  included  in  the  government  budget  constraint  of  time  t.
From  the  ﬁrst-order  conditions  for  the  elderly  (see
ppendix),  we  obtain  that  the  rate  of  substitution  between
o and  G  depends  exclusively  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  the
ublic  good:
ˇ1Gt
ˇ2c
o
t
= 1  +  gt
gt
(14)
hich  growth  rate  is  the  weighted  by  the  ˇ’s  ratio  of  the
onsumption  of  the  current  old  to  last  period’s  stock  of  G,
ince  Eqs.  (14)  and  (9)  imply  that:
t = ˇ2c
o
t
ˇ1Gt−1
(14′)
That’s  how  at  least  the  government  should  be  providing
he  public  good  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  elderly.  Solving
q.  (14)  for  Eq.  (3′), inserting  the  resulting  expression  in  Eq.
3′),  and  solving  for  co,  yields  that:
o
t =
ˇ1
ˇ1 +  ˇ2
[
t +  (1  +  t)
1  +  t Mt +
bt +  (1  +  it−1)
1  +  bt Bt
+(Tyt +  Tot+1) +  cyt
]
(15)
hich  when  inserted  back  in  Eq.  (14)  gives:
t = ˇ2(1  +  gt)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)gt
[
t +  (1  +  t)
1  +  t Mt +
bt +  (1  +  it−1)
1  +  bt Bt
+(Tyt +  Tot+1) +  cyt
]
(16)
These  are  the  demands  for  c  and  G  by  the  elderly,  and
heir  steady-state  values  are  simply  those  without  the  time
ubscript  in  Eqs.  (15)  and  (16).  They  are  the  best  response
o  whichever  the  choice  of  cyt may  be  by  the  young.
Next,  from  the  ﬁrst-order  conditions  for  the  young  (see
ppendix),  one  obtains  rates  of  substitution  depending  again
n  growth  rates  and  producing  the  following  solutions  for  c,
,  and  G:
y
t =
˛1
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
{
t +  Tot +
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt)
−1 +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t
]
Mt − (˛2 +  ˛3)c¯
y
˛1
}
,  (17)
t = ˛2(1  +  bt)
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
{
t +  Tot +
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt)
−1  +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t −
(1  +  t+1)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3)
˛2(1  +  it)(1  +  bt)
]
Mt − c¯y
}
,
(18)
nd
y
t =
˛3(1  +  gt)
gt(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3)
{
t +  Tot +
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt)−1  +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t
]
Mt − c¯y
}
,  (19)
a
i
d
b
w
s
i
i
t
o
b
s
c
c
B
G
w
t
i
t
w
d
i
n
h
h
a
c
e
c
r
i
b
n
l
o

s
i
r
Technically,  setting  ct ,  ct ,  Bt,  and  Gt in  Eqs.  (24),
(25), (26), and  (27)  equal  to  cyt ,  c
o
t ,  Bt,  and  G
y
t +  Goy in  Eqs.
(17), (20), (18), and  (19)  +  (21), respectively,  one  obtainsMonetary  rules  and  ﬁscal  feedback  rules  
These  are  the  demands  for  c,  B,  and  G  by  the  young,  and
their  steady-state  values  are  simply  those  without  the  time
subscript  in  Eqs.  (17)--(19).  Inserting  Eqs.  (17)  and  (18)  in
Eqs.  (15)  and  (16)  will  produce  the  Nash-follower  values  of
co and  G  of  the  elderly,  which  are  complicated  expressions
and  only  that  for  co will  be  presented,  as  it  is  needed  for
comparison  purposes  below:
cot =
ˇ1˛2[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˇ 1˛1
(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3) (t +  T
o
t )
− ˇ1˛2[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˇ 1(˛2 +  ˛3)
(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3) c¯
y
+ ˇ1
ˇ1 +  ˇ2 (T
y
t +  Tot+1)  +  Mt (20)
and
Got =
ˇ1˛2[(1  +  gt)[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˇ 2˛1(1  +  gt)
gt(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3)
×  (t +  Tot − c¯y)  +
ˇ2(1  +  gt)
(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)gt (T
y
t +  Tot+1)  +  Mt, (21)
where    and    are  long  sums  of  parameter  ratios  immate-
rial  to  our  discussion  here  and  therefore,  presented  in  the
Appendix.
Let  us  instead  proceed  with  the  ﬁrst-order  conditions  for
the  government  (see  Appendix).  A  couple  of  remarks  should
be  made  based  on  these  rates  of  substitution  before  we
proceed  to  the  solution  of  cyt ,  c
o
t ·  ·Bt,  and  Gt.  Firstly,  from
Eq.  (A5)  in  the  Appendix:
∂W/∂c
y
t
∂W/∂cot
= ε˛1c
o
t
(1  −  ε)ˇ1(cyt − c¯y)
= 1 (22)
it  is  clear  that  age  discrimination  in  private  affairs  would
be  suboptimal  for  the  society  and  for  the  government.  From
Eq.  (A5),  but  also  from  Eqs.  (A7)  and  (A9), one  obtains:
˛3ε  =  ˇ2(1  −  ε) (23)
and  concludes  that  what  would  be  optimal  for  the  govern-
ment  as  a  social  planner  is  to  discriminate  between  the  two
concurrent  generations  according  to  their  preferences  for
the  public  good  at  time  t  (given  that  the  preference  struc-
ture  of  the  current  young  need  not  be  the  same  when  they
become  old).  Second,  Eqs.  (A6)  and  (A8)  imply  that  it =  it−1,
i.e.  that  societal  welfare  is  maximized  when  the  nominal
interest  rate  is  kept  constant  as,  for  example,  under  Fried-
man’s  rule,  which  prescribes  a  zero  such  rate  all  the  time.
In  view  of  Eq.  (7),  a  constant  i means  that  inﬂation  and  bond
liquidity  variations  cancel  out,  and  this  can  be  the  case  only
if  bt =  it−1 as  noted  at  the  outset.
Setting  bt = it−1,  indicates  that  the  planner  ﬁnds  it  opti-
mal  to  be  matching  the  current  bond  growth  rate  with  last
period’s  nominal  interest  rate,  or  the  same  to  be  preser-
ving  bond  market  equilibrium  by  satisfying  the  change  in  the
demand  of  bonds  brought  about  by  bond  price  changes  last
period,  crystallized  inversely  by  that  period’s  nominal  inter-
est  rate.  These  price  changes  are  in  response  to  changes  in
bond  liquidity  as  decided  by  the  young.
Assume,  for  instance,  that  when  the  young  sell  goods  to
the  old,  they  decide  to  accept  payment  directly  in  bonds
a
w
c
e41
s  they  do  with  money.  r,  which  is  the  price  of  bond  liquid-
ty,  falls  immediately  to  zero  at  the  same  time  at  which  this
ecision  of  the  young  is  equivalent  to  increased  demand  for
onds.  This  increased  demand  raises  the  price  of  the  bond,
hich  is  the  acquisition  cost  of  a  bond  in  terms  of  the  con-
umption  good.  More  of  this  good  is  offered  by  the  young
n  exchange  of  the  same  amount  of  bonds.  The  purchas-
ng  power  of  bonds  increases,  raising  the  price  level  and
hereby  the  nominal  interest  rate,  ceteris  paribus  A  policy
f  bt =  it−1 =  it comes  to  restore  equilibrium  as  a  necessary
ut  not  sufﬁcient  condition  as  the  following  solution  to  the
ocial  planner’s  problem  suggests:
y
t =  
1[t +  
2Mt]  +
[
ε(˛2 −  ˛3)  −  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)
ε˛1
]
c¯y (24)
o
t =
(1  −  ε)ˇ1
ε˛1
{
1[t +  
2Mt]  +  [
3]c¯y}  (25)
t =  −1 +  t+11  +  it Mt +
˛2(1  +  bt)
˛1[bt +  (1  +  it−1)] {
1[t +  
2Mt]
+  [
3]c¯y}  (26)
y+o
t =
[ε˛3 +  (1  −  ε)ˇ2](1  +  gt)
ε˛1gt
{
1[t +  
2Mt]  +  [
3]c¯y}
(27)
here  the  
’s  are  as  in  the  Appendix.  Of  course,  Gy+ot is
he  total  amount  of  the  public  good  for  both  generations
ncluding  that  which  the  current  young  think  in  line  with
heir  current  preferences  that  they  would  like  to  consume
hen  old.
It  is  easily  checked  that  under  the  same  ,  all  partial
erivatives  with  respect  to  M  are  negative:  Suppose,  for
nstance,  that  the  old  get  more  than  planned  M  to  chan-
el  into  purchases  of  c  from  the  young.  The  government
as  simply  printed  more  money  to  increase  G.  If    and
ence,  M  are  not  expected  to  return  back  to  ‘‘normal’’,
ll,  cy,  co,  and  G,  will  have  to  be  adjusted  downwards  in
onsumer  plans,  and  ﬁnances  will  have  to  change  at  the
xpense  of  B  in  response  to  this  crowding-out  effect  on  the
onstant  supply  of    from  heaven.  . . And,  an  interest  rate
ule  can  do  nothing  to  deter  or  correct  this  government-
nduced  distortion,  this  societally  suboptimal  equilibrium,
ecause  the  derivatives  with  respect  to  M  continue  being
egative  even  if  bt =  it−1 =  it.  Unless    is  allowed  to  vary,  since
owering  it  would  simply  tax  away  the  ‘‘extra’’  M  of  the
ld  the  same  way  a  direct  tax  increase  on  the  old  would.
 is  a  monetary  as  much  as  ﬁscal  policy  instrument  and
hould  be  used  discretionarily  along  with  the  rule  bt =  it−1 =  it
n  keeping  the  economy  at  the  optimal  societal  equilib-
ium.
y o y+o system  of  four  equations  in  the  four  tax  variables,  which
hen  solved  will  give  the  tax  structure  needed  to  have
oincidence  between  planner  and  individual  optima.  For
xample,  equating  Eq.  (24)  with  Eq.  (17)  yields  that:
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o
t =
2ε˛2 −  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)
ε(˛1 −  ˛2 +  ˛3)  +  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)t +
(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3)[ε(
+
{
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
˛1

1
2 −
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt) −
1 +  t+1(1  +
1  +  t
hich  is  the  simplest  expression  for  Tot ,  since  another
ne  may  be  obtained  by  equating  B’s.  We  have  actually
he  two  remaining  equalities  to  be  solved  for  the  sum
y
t +  Tot+1 and  ,  but  it  is  clear  that  we  are  dealing  with
ighly  complicated  non-linear  expressions  in  terms  of  the
preference)  parameters  accompanying  t, Mt,  and c¯y, plus
he  coefﬁcient  t accompanying  especially  Mt.  They  would
ot  help  analytically,  because  taxes  act  no  differently  than
.  The  solutions,  the  whole  approach,  actually  suggest  that
e  are  really  dealing  with  feedback  tax  rules,  i.e.  with  a
ax  system  neutralizing  any  disturbances  from  continuing
ollowing  the  interest  rate  rule  off  societal  optimum.
Indeed,  from  an  intergenerational  perspective,  mone-
ary  rules  and  ﬁscal  discretion  are  not  mutually  exclusive
ut  complementary  to  each  other  in  fostering  the  societally
ptimum  equilibrium  when  taxation  serves  as  a  feedback
ule.  It  is  a  policy  mix  which  is  Kydland--Prescott  (1977)  con-
istent  and  at  the  same  time,  Pollak  (1968)  optimal,  because
ven  if    summarizes  a  time-invariant  cash-in-advance  con-
traint  on  the  part  of  the  policymaker,  the  combination  of  an
nterest  rate  rule  with  ﬂexible  taxation,  does  allow  the  pol-
cymaker  at  t  +  1  to  contemplate  on  his  policy  effects  given
he  expectations  formed  at  t:  In  Tot above,  (1  +  t+1)Mt is  the
xpectation  about  Mt+1 formed  at  t.  The  iterative  process  of
he  rule  may  be  incorporating  these  expectations  through
heir  impact  on  a  tax  policy,  which  has  been  designed  to
erve  as  a  feedback  rule.  The  real  issue  for  the  public  is
ot  any  steady  state,  but  whether  or  not  its  government  is
cting  as  a  social  planner,  having  developed  means  of  mon-
toring  and  materializing  its  wishes  whenever  the  optimum
s  disturbed,  incapacitating  its  rules;  and,  this  means  is  the
ax  policy.
. Concluding remarks
ur  results  are  in  the  spirit  of  Wallace  (1980)  and  Kareken
nd  Wallace  (1981)  in  that  constant  money-growth  pol-
cy  expectations  may  result  in  suboptimal  societally  and
till,  optimal  in  a  Barro--Gordon  (1983)  sense  equilibria,
hen  in  our  case  such  expectations  continue  to  be  held
ff  societal  optimum.  Also,  based  on  the  Helpman--Sadka
1979)  shopping  time  approach  to  cash-in-advance  and
oney-in-the-utility-function,  our  results  are  in  the  spirit
f  Bryant  and  Wallace  (1980)  and  Sargent  and  Wallace
1981)  in  that  the  rich  want  to  hold  more  bonds  than  the
oor;  the  rich  in  our  case  being  all  agents  before  soci-
tal  equilibrium  disturbance,  and  the  poor  being  all  again
gents  at  a  societally  suboptimal,  Barro--Gordon  like  equi-
ibrium.
Much  more  important,  however,  in  understanding  our
esults  is  their  relationship  with  the  thesis  of  Gahvari
nd  Micheletto  (2009,  p.  1)  that  ‘‘the  ability  to  levy
onlinear  taxes  can  neutralize  monetary  policy  only  if
he  source  of  heterogeneity  concerns  earning  abilities,
s  in  da  Costa  and  Werning  (2008),  but  not  if  it  concerns
eterogeneity  of  the  type  Williamson  (2008)  has  in  mind.’’
e
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 ˛3) −  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)]  +  ε˛1(˛2 +  ˛3)
ε˛21
c¯y
}
Mt
his  paper  too,  presumes  such  ability  as  well  as  earn-
ngs  equilibrium-dependent  heterogeneity  upon  reﬂection
n  that  a  suboptimal  equilibrium  would  simply  be  fostered
s  an  optimum  one  if  the  endowment   of  the  young  were
ess.  It  is  a  heterogeneity  which  is  independent  not  only
rom  age  but  also  from  variations  in  the  ability  to  access
nancial  institutions,  which  ability  is  what  Williamson  (2008)
mphasizes.  And,  within  such  a framework,  our  nonlinear
irrleesian  taxes  do  neutralize  a  constant   policy  off  soci-
tal  optimum;  but  they  do  so  shaped  under  the  consequent
onetary  policy  expectations,  allowing  thus  the  continua-
ion  of  the  operation  of  our  interest  rate  rule.
From  Romer’s  (1975)  political  economy  view  of  tax  non-
inearity,  our  taxes  herein  do  constitute  a Fudenberg--Levine
1993)  majority  rule  equilibrium,  because  simply  at  disequi-
ibrium,  the  consensus  about  the  ordering  of  the  alternatives
‘stability  vs.  instability’’  favors  unanimously  stability  à
a  Roberts  (1977);  these  are  clearly  the  preferences  crys-
allized  in  monetary  policy  expectations  off  equilibrium.
isequilibrium  does  upset  plans  but  tax  policy  conﬁrms
xpectations  about  the  unanimous  quest  in  words  and
ractice  for  equilibrium  restoration.  This  is  the  mentality
nder  which  tax  policy  is  voted  for  in  the  ﬁrst  place.  Of
ourse,  this  is  an  ‘‘angelic’’  world  since  all  policy  turns  out
o  be  a  Kranich  (2002)  perfect  foresight  majority  rule  equi-
ibrium  as  well.  It  is  a  world  in  which  the  future  policymaker
eed  not  worry  about  the  political  effects  of  the  current  tax
olicy  and  the  subsequent  incapacitation  of  rules.
Possibly  because  intergenerational  conﬂicts  of  interest
re  alleviated  by  intrafamily  intergenerational  altruism:  ‘‘It
s  well-known  that  macrodynamic  models  with  ﬁnite-lived
nd  selﬁsh  individuals  are  compatible  with  (dynamically)
nefﬁcient  equilibria,  while  models  with  inﬁnite-lived  and
ynastically  altruistic  individuals  are  not.  This  suggests  that
trong  intergenerational  altruism  within  the  population  and
ong  life  expectancy  prevent  the  occurrence  of  inefﬁcient
quilibria’’,  (d’Albis  and  Decreuse,  2009,  p.  1897).  And,
ilhelm  et  al.  (2008)  show  that  parental  generosity  toward
heir  children  can  be  hereditary  and  remark  that  it  can  even
ake  the  place  of  government  transfer  policy  in  a  Ricardian-
quivalence  fashion.  Although  these  are  quite  plausible
rguments  made  in  connection  with  the  steady  state  when  as
bserved  in  the  introductory  section  not  even  money  would
e  necessary  if  not  as  a  lubricant,  it  might  equally  plausi-
ly  claimed  that  at  disequilibrium  intergenerational  altruism
lleviates  the  business  cycle,  (leaving  thereby  much  room
or  the  presence  of  a  social  planner).
A  formal  treatment  of  such  issues  lies  certainly  beyond
he  scope  of  this  paper.  The  same  can  be  said  about  the
isrupting  effects  from  ‘‘frictions’’  stemming  from  the  pres-
nce  of  an  underground  economy  (see  e.g.  Snyder  and
ramer,  1988) and  tax  collection  problems  (see  e.g.  Hindriks
t  al.,  1999).  Instead,  there  are  two  points  on  methodol-
gy  that  need  to  be  stressed  as  an  epilog  to  this  paper:
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From  Eq.  (A5),  but  also  from  Eqs.  (A7)  and  (A9):
cot
y y
= (1  −  ε)ˇ1
ε˛Monetary  rules  and  ﬁscal  feedback  rules  
Firstly,  the  analytical  usefulness  of  the  employment  of  a
social  welfare  function  in  the  place  of  the  usual  ‘‘Diamond
utility  function’’  when  tackling  policymaking  given  that  pol-
icy  should  be  motivated  by  the  three  welfare  desiderata  of
Pareto-efﬁciency,  envy-freeness,  and  equitability.  And,  sec-
ond,  the  persistence  technically  on  time  subscripts,  invoking
upon  steady-state  considerations  only  for  insight  as  to  the
direction  of  policymaking,  given  that  policy  problems  arise
when  steady-state  is  disturbed  and  the  task  is  to  turn  the
clock  back  to  the  future. .  .. It  is  because  our  deliberation
on  the  topic  originated  from  such  a  perception  of  things
that  a  highly  stylized  model  managed  to  produce  worthy  of
discussion  propositions.
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Appendix.
First-order  conditions  regarding  the  elderly  (where  Vot is  the
Lagrangean  and  o is  the  Lagrange  multiplier):
∂Vot
∂cot
=  0  => U
o
t ˇ1
cot
=  vopt
∂Vot
∂Gt
=  0  => U
o
t ˇ2
Got−1
=  vopt gt1  +  gt
Their  ratio  gives  Eq.  (14)  in  the  text,  which  given  Eq.  (9),
becomes  Eq.  (14′).
First-order  conditions  regarding  the  young  (where  Vyt
denotes  the  Lagrangean  function  and  v  is  the  Lagrange  mul-
tiplier):
∂V
y
t
∂c
y
t
=  0  => ˛1U
y
t
(cyt − c¯y)
= vpt
∂V
y
t
∂Bt
=  0  => ˛2(1  +  it)U
y
t
(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt =
vpt
1  +  bt
∂V
y
t
∂Gt
=  0  => ˛3U
y
t
Gt
= vptgt
(1  +  gt)
It  follows  that:
∂U
y
t /∂c
y
t
∂U
y
t /∂Bt
= ˛1[(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]
˛2(1  +  it)(cyt − c¯y)
= 1  +  bt (A1)
∂U
y
t /∂c
y
t
∂U
y
t /∂Gt
= ˛1Gt
˛3(c
y
t − c¯y)
= 1  +  gt
gt
(A2)
∂U
y
t /∂Bt
∂U
y
t /∂Gt
= ˛2(1  +  it)Gt
˛3[(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt] =
1  +  gt
gt(1  +  bt) (A3)From  Eqs.  (A2)  and  (9):
gt = ˛3(c
y
t − c¯y)
˛1Gt−1
(A2′) w
i43
hich  will  coincide  with  Eq.  (14′)  if:
cot
c
y
t − c¯y
= ˛3ˇ1
˛1ˇ2
(A4)
Solving  Eq.  (A1)  for  Bt and  Eq.  (A2)  for  Gt, inserting  the
ubsequent  relations  in  Eq.  (5′),  and  solving  for  cyt ,  yields
q.  (17), which  when  put  back  in  the  expressions  for  Bt and
t found  from  Eqs.  (A1)  and  (A2),  respectively,  will  give  Eqs.
18)  and  (19).
First-order  conditions  regarding  the  government  (Wˆ  is  the
agrangean  and wˆ is the  Lagrange  multiplier):
∂Wˆ
∂c
y
t
=  0  => ε˛1W
(cyt − c¯y)
= wˆpt
∂Wˆ
∂Bt
=  0  => ε˛2(1  +  it)W
(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt =
wˆ[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]pt
1  +  bt
∂Wˆ
∂Gt
=  0  => [ε˛3 +  (1  −  ε)ˇ2]W
Gt
= wˆgtpt
1  +  gt
∂Wˆ
∂cot
=  0  => (1  −  ε)ˇ1W
cot
= wˆpt
It  follows  that:
∂W/∂c
y
t
∂W/∂cot
= ε˛1c
o
t
(1  −  ε)ˇ1(cyt − c¯y)
= 1  (A5)
∂W/∂c
y
t
∂W/∂Bt
= ˛1[(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]
˛2(1  +  it)(cyt − c¯y)
= 1 +  bt
bt +  (1  +  it−1)
(A6)
∂W/∂c
y
t
∂W/∂Gt
= ε˛1Gt
[ε˛3 +  (1  −  ε)ˇ2](cyt − c¯y)
= 1  +  gt
gt
(A7)
∂W/∂cot
∂W/∂Bt
= (1 −  ε)ˇ1[(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]
ε˛2(1  +  it−1)cot
= 1  +  bt
bt +  (1  +  it−1) (A8)
∂W/∂cot
∂W/∂Gt
= (1 −  ε)ˇ1Gt
[ε˛3 +  (1  −  ε)ˇ2]cot
= 1  +  gt
gt
(A9)
∂W/∂Bt
∂W/∂Gt
= ε˛2(1  +  it)Gt
[ε˛3 +  (1  −  ε)ˇ2][(1  +  it)Bt +  (1  +  t+1)Mt]
= (1  +  gt)[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]
gt(1  +  bt) (A10)ct − c¯ 1
hich  in  view  of  Eq.  (A4)  implies  that: (1−ε)ˇ1
ε˛1
= ˛3ˇ1
˛1ˇ2
and  this
n  turn,  Eq.  (23).
4
[bt +
(1  

 {˛22[b
a
t+1)
b
l
1˛1 (
Mt
ˇ2(1
(ˇ1 +
1  −  ε
ε˛


 ˛3
2 +  
˛
− (1
}
R
A
A
A
A
B
B
B4  
Finally,
 = ˇ1
ˇ1 +  ˇ2
{
t +  (1  +  t)
1  +  t +
1
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
[
˛1(1  +  t+1) −  
− [1  +  t+1(1  +  t)]{˛2[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˛1}
1  +  t
]}
 = ˇ2(1  +  gt)
(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)gt
{
t +  (1  +  t)
1  +  t +
1
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
[
(1  +  t+1) −
− [1  −  t+1(1  +  t)]{˛2[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˛1}
1  +  t
]}
nd

1 = ε˛1
ε(˛1 −  ˛2 +  ˛3)  +  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)

2 = [t −  t+1(1  +  t)](1  +  bt)(1  +  it)  −  [bt +  (1  +  it−1)](1  +  (1  +  t)(1  +  bt)(1  +  it)

3 = ε(2˛2 −  2˛3 −  ˛1)  −  2(1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)
ε(˛1 −  ˛2 +  ˛3)  +  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)
Now,  a  solution  for  Tyt +  Tot+1 and    only  numerically  may
e  approximated,  since  the  equations  involved  are  the  fol-
owing  four:
(1  −  ε)ˇ1
ε˛1
{
1[t +  
2Mt]  +  [
3]c¯y}  = ˇ1˛2[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˇ(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3)
+ ˇ1
ˇ1 +  ˇ2 (T
y
t +  Tot+1)  +  
ˇ2˛2(1  +  gt)[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]  +  ˇ 2˛1(1  +  gt)
gt(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)(˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3) (t +  T
o
t − c¯y)  +
+
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt) −
1 +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t
]
Mt − c¯y}  = [ε˛3 +  (
1[t +  
2Mt]  +
[
ε(˛2 −  ˛3)  −  (1  −  ε)(ˇ1 +  ˇ2)
ε˛1
]
c¯y = ˛1
˛1 +  ˛2 +
×
{
t +  Tot +
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt) −
1 +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t
]
Mt − (˛
˛2(1  +  bt)
˛1 +  ˛2 +  ˛3
{
t +  Tot +
[
1  +  t+1
(1  +  it)(1  +  bt) −
1 +  t+1(1  +  t)
1  +  t
=  −1 +  t+1
1  +  it Mt +
˛2(1  +  bt)
˛1[bt +  (1  +  it−1)]
{

1[t +  
2Mt] +  [
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